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Osler: Amoral Numbers and Narcotics Sentencing

AMORAL NUMBERS AND NARCOTICS
SENTENCING
Mark Osler*
I. INTRODUCTION
We Americans are strangely drawn to numbers. We pore over
football rankings before any team has played a game. We endlessly
discuss “Ten Best” lists of songs or movies or television shows, ignoring
the sheer subjectivity of that entire process. In my own field, we treat the
largely artificial law school rankings as if they came down from an
objective (and judging) God.
In each instance, the numerical orders we obsess over pretend to
describe an existing hierarchy. In truth, they are creating one. A team
becomes the “preseason favorite” and that shapes further outcomes. A
dress is listed as a “hot new look” on the cover of a magazine and
therefore becomes one. A law school rises in the rankings for reasons
having nothing to do with quality and that undeserved image of quality
becomes their identity, leading to the enrollment of more and better
qualified students—at least for a year.
This attraction to numerical systems, which create rather than
describe reality, too often leads us to false priorities and bad decisions.
Such is the case with the numerical matrices at the center of federal
criminal law: the arbitrary mandatory minimums and sentencing
guidelines that rank-order the severity of crimes have time and again
created broad and often tragic outcomes in our society. This dysfunction
is perhaps most clearly seen in the laws and guidelines governing
narcotics. These drug sentencing rankings too often are unrooted in
anything of substance,1 yet have created a new and troubling reality—
the destruction of communities, the imprisonment of thousands of
citizens, and the spending of billions of dollars, all of which create the
baseless illusion that we are “doing something” about illegal narcotics.2

Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas (MN).
For example, the Supreme Court described the sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine
as resulting from a process that “did not take account of ‘empirical data and national
experience.’” See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (McConnell, J.,
concurring) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)).
2
See generally Jessica M. Eaglin, Neorehabilitation and Indiana’s Sentencing Reform
Dilemma, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 867 (2013) (exploring the incarceration boom in Indiana and
proposing a new model of criminal justice reform); Brian G. Gilmore & Reginald Dwayne
Betts, Deconstructing Carmona: The U.S. War on Drugs and Black Men as Non-Citizens, 47
VAL. U. L. REV. 777 (detailing the ways in which the war on drugs has affected AfricanAmerican communities).
*

1

755

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 3 [2013], Art. 3

756

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

This Article seeks to describe the problem of these criminal law
systems, which create rather than reflect reality, and to suggest a better
way that will acknowledge our fascination with numbers yet turn us
away at least from the worst outcomes of our current and wildly
deceptive system of normative rankings, such as sentencing guidelines
and mandatory minimum sentences.
Part II broadly describes how our society is drawn to numerical
systems that are often unmoored from an existing reality, yet often create
one, and provides three examples. Most strikingly to those of us in legal
education, the rankings of law schools are one good example of this
effect.
Part III moves to specifics and establishes how it is that the
numerical sets at the center of criminal law steer us wrong. This
examination centers on four types of numerical measures: sentencing
guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, the weight of narcotics
possessed as a mistaken proxy for culpability in drug trafficking, and the
number of narcotics cases as well as the resulting sentences as a flawed
indicia of success in drug interdiction.
In turn, Part IV suggests a better way to use numbers in the field of
narcotics interdiction, one that will move towards solving the problem of
narcotics use rather than simply towards mass incarceration.3
Numbers are not the enemy, but neither have they proven to be the
solution. As we re-examine the way in which we address narcotics, part
of that evaluation should focus on the careless way we have let
numerical systems become not just tools, but a shimmering hologram of
principle itself, directing action even though there is no humanity
within.
II. THE ALLURE OF NUMBERS
Before looking at how mandatory minimums and sentencing
guidelines in criminal law create rather than reflect a hierarchy of
seriousness, it is appropriate to examine how this works in other areas.
Criminal law, it turns out, is not alone in suffering from this
phenomenon.
I’m not the first to note the preponderance of meaningless rankings;
as usual, the satirists got there first. My current Senator, Al Franken,
deftly made his point about the way a veneer of objectivity can attach to
even the most subjective judgments once they are translated into a
For a thoughtful discussion on causes of mass incarceration, see Michael M. O’Hear,
Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern States: Origins and Trends, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 709
(2013).
3
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ranking or list by publishing his own “World Religions in Order of
Quality.”4 It is a joke, of course (it’s a comedy book, after all), but the
religious quality rankings play out intriguingly:
1. Judaism (Reform)
2. Judaism (Conservative)
3. Unitarianism
4. Christianity (Mainstream Protestant)
5. Christianity (Roman Catholic)
6. Islam (Muhammad Ali/Ahmad Rashad type)
7. Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, etc.
8. Judaism (Orthodox)
9. Christianity (Fundamentalist)
10. Islam (Fundamentalist)
Having looked over this list, I ask you to engage in a simple
reflection. Despite the obvious subjectivity, possible offensiveness, and
even the silliness of this list, announced beforehand, didn’t you find
yourself either agreeing or re-arranging the list mentally? In other
words, didn’t you, reading this simple, obvious hoax, engage with it
(even if just for a moment) as if it was real? That is the power of lists.
There is something within us that longs for order, even if that order is
baseless. We can take random things, compile them in a list, and that
ordering somehow becomes authentic.
Nor can we avoid lists and ranking. They are everywhere. Fashion
magazines are full of numbered lists of what is “in,” and those lists do
more to create popularity than to reflect it. This, unfortunately and
dangerously, extends beyond fashion itself to the body types within
those fashions. In the realm of college football, dynasties are built in part
on the strength of preseason rankings—supposedly descriptive lists
which instead create future realities through their effects on recruits and
program resources. Finally, and closest to home, the U.S. News and
World Report rankings of law schools does much more to create images
of quality than it does to reflect the actual and distinct strengths of
existing schools with enormous collateral damage to the operation of law
schools in the United States.

AL FRANKEN, OH, THE THINGS I KNOW!: A GUIDE TO SUCCESS, OR, FAILING THAT,
HAPPINESS 50 (2002). The book also includes a ranking of “places to hide once the shooting
starts” and an exhaustive list of “things you love” indexed to “what it causes.” Id. at 121,
139. The latter list contains the claim that watching The Bold and the Beautiful causes both
obesity and diabetes. Id. at 139.
4
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A. Marketing and Magazines
No one knows what appeals to us more than marketers (that is their
business, after all), and they frequently use lists, completely baseless
lists, to draw us in. For example, the designers of InStyle Magazine, a
magazine that is often prominently displayed near supermarket
checkout counters, carefully include the promise of some kind of list on
the front cover of every issue.5 Most issues contain more than one; for
example, the May 2012 cover for InStyle offers up not only a picture of
Cameron Diaz, but headlines for “12 Beauty Secrets Nobody Tells You,”
“92 Cute Spring Outfit Ideas,” and “187 Style Finds Under $50.”6
This profusion of lists isn’t accidental; there are no accidents on the
“front door” of a carefully tended magazine. Marketers know that
numbers draw us in and lend a sheen of authenticity to nearly
anything—even something as inherently subjective as an evaluation of
“cute spring outfits.”
When a fashion magazine sets out a list of “92 Cute Spring Outfits,”
of course, it is also proactively defining, in the public eye, those
particular spring outfits as being “cute.” It is hard to imagine a more
subjective measure than “cuteness.” In fact, just about the only public
measure of what kind of spring outfit is “cute” is just such a list. The
objectivity comes from the precise and somewhat odd number of cute
spring outfits: exactly ninety-two. At first glance, this may seem utterly
harmless.
But only at first glance. This normative function has a dark side.
Those cute outfits too often look cute only on a certain kind of body, and
therein lies the rub. Fashion magazines have come under attack for their
role in creating unrealistic body images in women, and especially in
teenage girls. In May 2012, one teenage girl, Julia Bluhm, staged a
protest outside of the offices of Seventeen magazine, asserting that the
magazine airbrushed photographs and that pictures in the magazine
“did not represent real adolescent females, and contributed to
unattainable ideals[,]” a charge that resonated with the public.7

See
Google
Image
Search
of
InStyle
Magazine,
GOOGLE
SEARCH,
https://www.google.com/ (search “InStyle Magazine cover”; then follow “Images”
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (revealing images of InStyle Magazine covers).
6
For a detail of this cover, see Ella Gregory, Cameron Diaz Covers InStyle US Wearing
Valentino, COCO’S TEA PARTY (Apr. 16, 2012), http://cocosteaparty.com/2012/04/camerondiaz-covers-instyle-us-wearing-valentino.html.
7
Hollie McKay, Teen Takes on Seventeen, Says Magazine Contributes to Body Image Issues,
FOXNEWS.COM (May 8, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2012/05/08/teen
-takes-on-seventeen-says-magazine-contributes-to-body-image-issues/print#.
5
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Numbers on a magazine cover, then, help to create a new reality,
and it is that new reality which can be directive to society as a whole.
The same is true in other areas as well.
B. Football Rankings
Every August, before a single college football game is played, a slew
of preseason rankings are issued. Most prominent among these are the
listings compiled by the Associated Press and USA Today.8 The polls
manage to include what turn out to be some spectacular flame-outs
among teams ranked highly in the preseason,9 even when other parts of
the poll are strikingly accurate. For example, in 2012, the Associated Press
poll accurately predicted the regular season finish of three preseason top
ten teams: Alabama at number two, Oregon at number five, and Georgia
at number six.10 It also chose to promote, as the top team in the nation, a
group which then went on to lose six games, including a loss in a thirdtier bowl played in El Paso.11
Of course, all the teams ranked in the preseason poll, even the flameouts, were, in a sense, big winners. That’s because rankings not only
reflect the quality of a school’s team, they play a role in creating and
maintaining the quality of the team. Highly ranked teams play more
often on television, which both generates more money and entices
recruits. Many newspapers commonly list and report only on games

The AP and USA Today rankings are used as part of the BCS rankings, which
determine major bowl eligibility, though the BCS poll itself does not issue preseason
rankings. The 2012 preseason rankings are available at Randy Chambers, College Football
Preseason Rankings 2012: AP and USA Today Top 25 Preview, BLEACHER REPORT (Aug. 27,
2012),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1312409-college-football-preseason-rankings2012-ap-and-usa-today-top-25-preview.
9
See id. (listing the University of Southern California as number one in the Associated
Press’s poll). For example, in 2012, the preseason number one team, the University of
Southern California, did not finish in the top twenty-five at the end of the regular season.
2012 NCAA Football Rankings—Postseason, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-football/
rankings (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
10
Compare Chambers, supra note 8 (detailing the Associated Press rankings for the 2012
preseason), with 2012 NCAA Football Rankings—AP Top 25 Week 15 (Dec. 2), ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/college-football/rankings/_/week/15 (last visited Apr. 26, 2013)
(detailing the Associated Press rankings for December 2, 2012, after the regular season had
finished but before any bowl games).
11
See John Erfort, Georgia Tech Beats Southern California in Sun Bowl, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Dec. 31, 2012, 11:51 PM), http://collegefootball.ap.org/article/georgia-tech-beatssouthern-california-sun-bowl-0 (explaining that the University of Southern California
football team, ranked number one in the preseason, lost in the Sun Bowl to a Georgia Tech
team that was only able to play in a bowl because of a special waiver from the NCAA,
required because of Georgia Tech’s losing regular-season record).
8
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involving local teams and those in the top twenty-five—meaning that
you have to be in the top twenty-five to be reported on nationally.
Importantly, all this is true not only of end-of-the-year rankings, but
also of the preseason rankings, which are made without the benefit of
any games having been played and involve teams with tremendous
turnover in personnel from year to year. Thus, even the seemingly
meaningless preseason rankings create a new reality—they determine
who goes into the season with confidence, who gets on television, who is
covered nationally, and who is most attractive to recruits.
To understand this effect, consider the biggest anomaly of the 2012
season, the University of Southern California—the team that ended with
that loss in El Paso. They started the season ranked first in the nation but
ended up with a (relatively) mediocre 7-5 regular-season record, which
included losses to Arizona, Notre Dame, Oregon, Stanford, and UCLA.12
Despite this seeming disaster, no one doubts that USC will be a powerful
team next year and into the future. One reason for this is that USC got
verbal commitments from top national high school players early on in
the 2012 season,13 while they were still riding the wave of what turned
out to be an undeserved national ranking. In other words, USC’s reality
in future years will in part be created by the completely inaccurate and
speculative preseason rankings in 2012.14 The ranking created a reality
(good recruits and likely future success) even as it proved so dismal at
reflecting the reality of USC’s strength.
Just as a completely arbitrary list of “cute summer outfits” can play a
role in body image problems, so these arbitrary football rankings create
problems—albeit, not as serious as the health issues related to bulimia
and anorexia. Because the preseason rankings tend to list the same
schools every year, they play a role in the continuation of a rigid
hierarchy within the sport. Even as a down year, for example, USC got a
boost from the preseason rankings, and the highly-ranked recruits they
scooped up early in the season will not be distributed to lesser teams,
depriving them of upward mobility. There are, after all, only a limited
number of players in the United States who are both big and fast. These
lesser teams continue to spend outrageous amounts of money to play
12
See 2012 USC Trojan Football Schedule, FBSCHEDULES.COM, http://www.fbschedules.
com/ncaa-12/pac-10/2012-usc-trojans-football-schedule.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2013)
(providing the University of Southern California’s win-loss record for 2012).
13
Rick McMahan, USC Football: The Recruits Who Will Save Lane Kiffin’s Job Beyond 2013
(Part 2), BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 11, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1439705usc-football-the-recruits-who-will-save-lane-kiffins-job-beyond-2013-part-2.
14
In the same way, the teams that were accurately predicted to succeed in 2012 by the
preseason poll (Alabama, Oregon, and Georgia, for example) will also be strengthened for
the future.
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big-time football, yet those schools are fighting a structure that
constantly tilts against them regardless of merit.
C. Law School Rankings
In the spring of each year, U.S. News and World Report issues its
annual ranking of law schools. It creates this listing by blending a
number of factors.15 Most important are two surveys of reputation. A
full quarter of the ranking is based on a “peer assessment” survey sent to
some law professors, while another 15% flows from the results of a
similar survey sent to lawyers and judges.16 The remainder of the score
is accounted for by assessments of job placement rates nine months after
graduation (14%), the LSAT scores of incoming students (12.5%),
expenditures per student (11.25%), undergraduate GPA’s of incoming
students (10%), job placement at graduation (4%), student-faculty ratio
(3%), the acceptance rate of the school (2.5%), bar passage rate (2%), and
library resources (.75%).17
Virtually every aspect of this survey has come under attack as either
unreliable or subject to manipulation by law schools.18 The “peer
review” portions, for example, which make up a large percentage of the
ranking criteria, are remarkably “sticky”—that is, they seem to stay the
same from year to year regardless of what is actually happening at a
given school.19 Moreover, the peer review by practicing lawyers and
judges suffers from a terribly low response rate: meaning that in an
average year fewer than 200 lawyers and judges have determined this
important part of the rankings.20 Shockingly, this means there are about
the same number of law schools in the United States as there are voters
See Sam Flanigan & Robert Morse, Methodology: Best Law School Rankings, U.S. NEWS
(Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-lawschools/articles/2012/03/12/methodology-law-school-rankings
(explaining
the
methodology used by U.S. News to rank law schools).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
One of the more persuasive critiques has come from Washington University Professor
Brian Z. Tamanaha, whose book, Failing Law Schools, contains a myriad of acute
observations relating to the U.S. News rankings. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW
SCHOOLS (2012).
19
This tendency extends even back before the advent of the U.S. News Rankings. Brian
Leiter of the University of Chicago has catalogued the static nature of reputational rankings
back to 1977 on his blog. Brian Leiter & Dan Filler, The More Things Change, the More They
Stay the Same . . . Again, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (Mar. 13, 2012),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2012/03/the-more-things-change-the-morethay-stay-the-sameagain.html.
20
TAMANAHA, supra note 18, at 79–80. U.S. News has been forced to begin averaging
over two years in this category. Id.
15
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in a sector of the rankings that provides a full 15% of the final tally.21
The other categories are also flawed, largely in that they invite “gaming”
by the schools to increase their rank. Law schools, for example, have
included any kind of employment and even hired their own graduates to
inflate “employment” figures,22 and have adjusted their policies on
transfers to maintain revenue without jeopardizing the LSAT numbers
that count for the U.S. News rankings.23 That is nothing, though,
compared to the outright lying about numbers engaged in over a period
of years by the law schools at Villanova and the University of Illinois.24
The pressure to do well has twisted the priorities of law schools in
some gruesome ways. Instead of using financial aid to help needy
students, grants are strategically employed by many schools to harvest
an incoming class with relatively high LSAT numbers and grades.25 The
result at schools which do not have huge endowments is that the
students most likely to get high-paying employment are subsidized by
the law school debt accumulated by their lower-scoring classmates.26
That is, if scholarships are funded by tuition money, it is the lessqualified students who subsidize those with better credentials. The
shocking meta-story here, combining the relative meaninglessness of the
rankings’ inputs and the importance of the results, is that the ranking
does far more to create outcomes than it does to reflect or report them.
For example, Professor Tamanaha points to the experience of Emory
Law School, which dropped eight places from the 2011 rankings to those
released in 2012.27 This drop did not correlate to any significant change
at that school, but it represented a tremendous driver of outcomes. The
dean resigned.28 Perhaps more importantly, it put Emory in the position
of having to put far more resources into luring the very best students in
terms of LSAT scores (rather than the neediest ones) just to maintain the
hope of returning to its former status, because the eight-point drop was
sure to produce a drop in applications and the qualifications of
21
Id. The U.S. News rankings released in 2012 listed 200 schools, and this did not
include those schools that are not accredited. Best Law Schools, U.S.NEWS, http://gradschools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/lawrankings/page+8 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
22
TAMANAHA, supra note 18, at 71–72.
23
Id. at 88–94.
24
Villanova and Illinois falsified data on the qualifications of incoming students. Id. at
74–76. See also Richard W. Painter, Numerical Half Truths, Human Lies, and Other Distortions
of Truth, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 479 (2013) (contending that the scandals at the University of
Illinois and Villanova were, at least in part, a result of “our obsession with the numbers”).
25
TAMANAHA, supra note 18, at 96–99.
26
Id. at 98.
27
Id. at 80.
28
Id.
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applicants.29 In turn, this furthers the unfortunate focus on LSAT scores,
rather than the life stories, financial need, or actual abilities of applicants.
As with fashion magazines and football rankings, law school
rankings create a new reality, which then takes on a life of its own, built
on smoke and mirrors.
III. NORMATIVE RANKINGS AND LISTS IN CRIMINAL LAW
In the fields described above, we saw how lists and rankings create
interest, direct outcomes, and give meaning to things even when there is
little or no empirical basis for the formulation of those lists themselves.
The same is true in criminal law.
The three examples given above (fashion magazines, college football,
and law schools) all involve lists that relate in some way to marketing of
a product or service. Fashion magazines are selling not only the
magazines, but the styles promoted by advertisers. College football is
selling tickets and seeks television revenue, all of which are benefits from
increased exposure. For law schools, U.S. News rankings are often used
in marketing materials, and the rankings themselves sustain a formerly
robust news organization, which has largely been reduced to a ranking
service.
But what about criminal law? Certainly, rankings such as those
found in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not driven by the same
kind of consumerist marketing, since there is nothing being bought and
sold (at least not directly). However, there is a common impulse at
work. Sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums are both the
creation of elected officials, people who are often anxious to be seen as
doing something about a particular type of crime. Just as a marketer who
needs to sell a dress would be well advised to have it be listed in InStyle
Magazine as a “cute summer look,” or a dean looking to increase the
status of his law school might try to game U.S. News ranking numbers,
so a politician who wants to seem thoughtful and forceful about crime
might look to create that image through the seeming objectivity of
numerical matrices. “Five years for five grams of crack” may not really
be that different than “92 Cute Spring Outfits.”
Here, we will examine four types of lists or ranking devices within
criminal narcotics law at the federal level: sentencing guidelines,
mandatory minimum sentences, the use of weight as a proxy for
culpability, and the use of the number of people incarcerated or drugs
seized as a measure of success. Taken together, these numbers-based
systems have a tremendous influence on the operation of criminal law.
29

Id.
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Indeed, as caseloads grow, it is easy to understand how numerical
systems would seem like a good idea, as they tend both to promise
uniformity in sentencing from case to case and greater efficiency.
I focus here on federal systems not because they are most important,
but because they are capable of being described within the scope of this
Article. State experiences vary widely, and others have already done an
excellent job of cataloguing this diversity. Moreover, the federal
experience has defined anti-drug efforts in the national media, in part
because narcotics captured the attention of Congress. As Frank Zimring
put it, “The lead role in declaring a war on drugs was played by
Congress, which has throughout the period after 1914 played a much
larger role in penal policy regarding drugs than any other forms of
crime.”30 If we are looking for a national view of sentencing trends and
effects, there really is only one national system of sentencing.
A. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
1.

Hierarchy Within the Guidelines

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were implemented in 1987.31 For
nearly two decades they were mandatory, but in 2005 the Supreme Court
ruled in United States v. Booker that to preserve the constitutionality of the
guideline system they would be “advisory” to sentencing judges.32
Despite this advisory status, the Sentencing Guidelines continue to have
great weight in federal sentencing. The structure of the sentencing
process still largely centers on a narrow sentencing range produced by
these guidelines, and there are still substantial disincentives to varying
from the guideline range.33
One of the more fascinating features of these guidelines is the formal
ranking it necessarily creates, putting in order the perceived relative
severity of various crimes. The Guidelines are based around a grid that
lists sentencing ranges according to two inputs: the seriousness of the
offense, which defines a numerical “offense level,” and the defendant’s
Franklin E. Zimring, Sanctions: Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 331–332 (2005). Zimring notes that more than a quarter of
the people imprisoned nationally for drug crimes were federal prisoners, compared to
about four percent of those imprisoned for “common violent and property crimes.” Id. at
332 (footnote omitted).
31
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch.1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2012).
32
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
33
See Mark Osler, Seeking Justice Below the Guidelines: Sentencing as an Expression of
Natural Law, 8 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 172–73 (2010) (discussing several disincentives to
varying from the Sentencing Guidelines). These disincentives include a desire to avoid
reversal, the public tracking of sentences, and the risk of inviting greater restrictions. Id.
30
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prior criminal history.34 Offense levels are calculated starting from a
“base level,” to which are added various points for aggravating factors
(or, more rarely, points are subtracted for mitigating factors). For
example, the base offense level for a simple kidnapping is thirty-two
points.35 To that base level, six points are added if a ransom demand is
made,36 four points are added if the victim suffers permanent injury,37
and six more points are added if the victim is sexually exploited,38
among other factors.
In contrast, insider trading is a less serious crime under the Federal
Guidelines with a base offense level of eight,39 with enhancements
available based on the amount of money the defendant gained from the
scheme.40 The widely varying offense levels between these two crimes
produce very different sentences under the Guidelines. For example, if
we look at the simplest form of each (that is, without enhancements), as
committed by someone with no criminal history, the result is that the
trader would be subjected to an advisory guideline range of zero to sixty
months, while the kidnapper would face a sentence of 121–151 months.41
At a very basic level, then, the Sentencing Guidelines create a
hierarchy, which is revealed through relative offense level scores. At the
top of that hierarchy will be the most serious crimes and at the bottom
will be the least serious crimes, because we naturally want to give the
harshest punishments to those who commit the most serious crimes. The
Guidelines themselves refer to this ordering of seriousness as
“proportionality.”42 To order crimes into a hierarchy of seriousness and
then call that ordering “proportionality” certainly gives the result an air
of scientific precision. This impression is reinforced by the sheer heft of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (now expanded to three thick
volumes) and the impressive progression of punishment set out in the
sentencing grid.43 However, that air is nothing more than a vapor,
especially when we look at the Guidelines’s sense of proportionality as
applied to narcotics sentences.
The story behind the creation of this “proportional” hierarchy was
revealed by one of its framers, now-Justice Stephen Breyer of the U.S.
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.5, pt. A, tbl.
Id. § 2A4.1(a).
Id. § 2A4.1(b)(1).
Id. § 2A4.1(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 2A4.1(b)(5).
Id. § 2B1.4(a).
Id. § 2B1.4(b)(1).
Id. at ch.5, pt. A, tbl.
Id. at ch. A, pt. A, at 3.
Id. at ch. 5, pt. A, tbl.
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Supreme Court, who was a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
from 1985 to 1989 while serving as a judge on the First Circuit Court of
Appeals. Writing in the Hofstra Law Review about the process the
Commission used to draft the first set of guidelines, Justice Breyer laid
bare a completely unscientific and in fact quite messy process.44 It
appears that almost immediately there was conflict on the Commission
as “different Commissioners [had] different views about the correct rank
order of the seriousness of different crimes. . . . [T]he members of the
group inherently tend[ed] to ‘trade’ over particular items so that each
person [found] his own views reflected only some, but not all, of the
time.”45 From Breyer’s report, it seems that the commissioners were
reluctant to “abandon their own subjective values” and also expressly
rejected the systemic use of a more objective ordering mechanism, such
as public polling or an assessment of the possibility of deterrence.46
Deadlocked on this issue, Breyer reveals that “the Commission
reached an important compromise”: rather than trying to objectively
order the ranking of offense levels, they simply used data from previous
sentencings to mold the new guidelines from past practice, and then
adjusted them where they saw fit.47 There was simply no objective
principle at work in the end.
2.

Narcotics Within an Unprincipled Guideline Hierarchy

As described above, the Commission that framed up the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines did not use any meaningful sorting principle to
establish the hierarchy of seriousness that defines the offense-conduct
input to those Guidelines, other than an amalgamation of past
practices.48 This, in turn, left a blank slate (in a moral sense) for later
commissions and Congress, which had the power to alter that hierarchy
but were left without consistent or even articulable guidance on the basis
44
See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing the primary compromises the
Commission made in promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines).
45
Id. at 15.
46
Id. at 16.
47
Id. at 17–18.
48
In critiquing this process, I do not mean to denigrate any use of sentencing systems
that rely on collecting broad sentencing data, then making that available to judges or
others, provided that this process is used consistently as time goes on, rather than as the
baseline for a system which will then steadily increase that baseline independent of
systemic input from sentencing judges. In fact, I have advocated for real-time sentencing
information systems to be used in place of sentencing guidelines such as that in use in
federal courts. Such real-time systems would likely have the effect of moderating harsh
sentences. Mark Osler, The Promise of Trailing-Edge Sentencing Guidelines to Resolve the
Conflict Between Uniformity and Judicial Discretion, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 203 (2013).
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for that structure or its amendment. Flooding into that vacuum, reactive
politics filled the void. Not surprisingly, Congress proceeded to create
harsh drug sentences both in statutes49 and the Guidelines50 in a
frighteningly herky-jerky style, largely reacting to public reports about
new drug “epidemics.” The result was a guideline book that boasted a
stringent, yet baseless, sense of proportionality where narcotics sentences
regularly exceeded the terms of nearly every other type of crime.
The bizarre outcome of this process is easily observed. In the
Guidelines of today, for example, the base offense level for distributing
300 grams (about ten ounces) of crack cocaine or 500 grams of
methamphetamine is thirty-two,51 the same offense level we saw for
kidnapping. While this amount is far more than anyone would need for
personal use, it is hardly remarkable; large narcotics rings in a large city
might go through several times this amount in a single day. Yet, the
ranking afforded this offense, as reflected in the offense level of thirtytwo,52 is greater than that given for the forcible rape of an adult (thirty),53
killing a person in a voluntary manslaughter (twenty-nine),54 disclosing
top secret national defense information to the North Koreans (twentynine),55 arson creating a substantial risk of death (twenty-four), and
extortion (eighteen).56
As I have set out elsewhere,57 one fascinating aspect of this
dysfunctional ranking system is that it often punishes more harshly the
narcotics crime that indirectly victimizes people (through increased
violence, for example) than it does those direct victimizations. In other
words, one reason to punish drug activity is because it leads to things
Primarily through mandatory minimums, such as those included in 21 U.S.C. § 841.
Congress at times has directed changes to the Sentencing Guidelines themselves and
in 1995 vetoed a proposed change that would have lessened sentences for crack cocaine.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 2 (1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_
Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/19970429_RtC_Cocaine_
Sentencing_Policy.PDF.
51
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2012).
52
Justice Breyer’s Hofstra article implies that the Sentencing Commission in the end
decided not to create rankings relating to the severity of crimes. See Breyer, supra note 44.
However, that ignores reality; regardless of how the Commission thought of its work, the
bare fact that plays out in courtrooms daily is that the offense levels assigned to various
crimes are constructed as a numerical matrix. It is this ordinal ranking that plays a large
role in determining the sentences that people actually serve.
53
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.1(a)(2).
54
Id. § 2A1.3(a).
55
Id. § 2M3.3.
56
Id. § 2B3.2(a).
57
Mark Osler, Indirect Harms and Proportionality: The Upside-Down World of Federal
Sentencing, 74 MISS. L. J. 1 (2004).
49
50
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like random violence (manslaughter) and rape, yet we punish narcotics
trafficking more harshly than we do the actual commission of
manslaughter and rape under the hierarchy established by the
Guidelines. The drug trafficker described above has an offense level of
thirty-two—two more than the rapist, and three more than the person
who commits manslaughter. Drug dealing, it seems, is not only seen to
be an indirect cause of rape and killing, but somehow worse than
actually raping and killing (at least in some circumstances).
3.

How Guidelines Create Reality

The reality surrounding someone who sells 300 grams of crack is not
very remarkable. A low-level street dealer who sells ten grams every
day hits that standard in a single month after all. There is nothing about
that particular street-level dealer that distinguishes him from thousands
of others or makes him any more dangerous than other drug dealers. In
fact, it is hard to imagine anyone beyond the most casual and temporary
distributer not meeting this threshold if all relevant conduct is
considered.58 Yet, the Guidelines create a remarkable status for him—
serious offender worthy of very harsh punishment relative to others—
that is unrelated to any objective standard. This status simply does not
correlate to facts on the ground, given the probability that this particular
crack dealer is necessarily buying powder cocaine from someone else,
who is buying it from a network of others, who likely bought it from an
importer. Viewed holistically, the only thing that would define this
bottom-feeder as a serious offender relative to those others is the artifice
of the Sentencing Guidelines and the related numerical systems, such as
mandatory minimums.
In other words, this unsubstantiated status of serious offender
doesn’t exist until it is created by the Guidelines.
However, once that status is created by the Guidelines, it has very
real consequences. The defendant is much more likely to get a long
sentence, and that sentence is less likely to be overturned on appeal. We
taxpayers get to fund the housing of this defendant for that lengthy term.
One consequence we won’t see is this: any difference in actual drug
trafficking. Because street-level trafficking has such low barriers to
entry, the position will quickly be filled and nothing will change other
than a slight bump in American incarceration.

See Richard Levitt, The Impact of Uncharged Conduct in Sentencing, N.Y. L.J. (ONLINE)
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=12025707451
64&thepage=1. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, of course, uncharged relevant conduct is
considered at sentencing.
58
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B. Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Statutory minimum sentences are closely intertwined with the
Sentencing Guidelines in the federal system; for example, a mandatory
minimum will establish the effective floor for a guideline where both
apply except in certain defined circumstances.59 However, these
minimums are distinct from the Guidelines in at least two important
ways. First, they comprise a less comprehensive ranking system than the
Guidelines because they cover far fewer crimes. Second, they are even
more directive than the Guidelines because they are mandatory in most
cases.
Like the Guidelines, the statutory minimums set out in the federal
code hit hard at even minor narcotics offenders. The most-often used
mandatory minimum sentences are contained in 21 U.S.C. § 841, which
provides for stiff sentences for distributing a variety of narcotics. There
are two primary groups subjected to mandatory minimums under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b), which Congress referred to as “serious” traffickers and
“major” traffickers.60 For example, possessing with the intent to
distribute 280 grams of crack cocaine makes one a “major” trafficker and
earns you a minimum sentence of ten years (in the absence of prior
narcotics convictions—if you have one of those, the minimum doubles to
twenty years),61 while just five grams of methamphetamine gets a five
year minimum sentence (or ten years with a prior conviction) as a
“serious” trafficker.62
One odd feature of the mandatory minimums that perhaps pops out
more clearly in the statute than in the Guidelines is the often arbitrary
way in which drugs are valued in relation to one another. For example,
a five-year minimum applies to both ten grams of PCP63 and five grams
of methamphetamine,64 despite the fact that both drugs have the same
amount per dose, five micrograms.65 Why is it that methamphetamine is
59
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2. See generally Lynn Adelman, The
Adverse Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing on Wisconsin’s Efforts to Deal with Low-Level Drug
Offenders, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 689, 689 (2013) (“I have long been convinced that the federal
sentencing laws and guidelines result in an enormous amount of over-punishment,
particularly in drug cases.”).
60
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 5–6 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative
_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200205_RtC_
Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf.
61
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
62
Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii).
63
Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi) (PCP).
64
Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (Methamphetamine).
65
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. 9 (2012).
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taken twice as seriously as the very dangerous PCP?66 And why are both
of them ranked so far ahead of heroin, for which it takes a whopping 100
grams to meet the five-year threshold of this same provision?67
There really is no good answer. The ranking of methamphetamine
being more serious per dose than PCP, which in turn is more serious
than heroin, is abjectly arbitrary. Yet, the numbers, drawn from vapor,
create a hierarchy that has real effects and drives the engine of overincarceration.
One aspect of mandatory minimums that extends beyond the effects
of the guideline matrix is the way that not only narcotics but the
possession of firearms in relation to narcotics trafficking is subjected to
harsh sentences, even when the firearm isn’t used, or even shown.68 One
of the sharpest denunciations of these minimums came in an awardwinning opinion by Judge Paul Cassell of Utah.69 In that case, United
States v. Angelos,70 a first-time narcotics offender ran into a welter of
mandatory guidelines after being convicted of two small-time ($350)
marijuana sales and the possession of three guns (which were not used
or brandished in the course of the crimes).71 Because of these statutory
minimums, Judge Cassell was compelled to impose a fifty-five-year
sentence.
In his opinion, Judge Cassell not only expressed his disagreement
with the arbitrariness of the statutory minimums (calling them “unjust,
disproportionate to his offense, demeaning to victims of actual criminal
violence—but nonetheless constitutional”),72 he called for a presidential
commutation of the sentence he was giving.73 Moreover, Judge Cassell
did something remarkable, unusual, and illuminating: he critiqued the
mandatory minimums by bringing to the surface the false ranking of
seriousness that they contain. Specifically, Judge Cassell included in the
66
PCP is so dangerous that, according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, clinical
trials on humans could not be completed because of negative effects on the subjects. See
PCP/Phencyclidine, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (last updated Dec. 2012),
http://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/pcpphencyclidine.
67
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
68
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) (providing the primary narcotic/gun mandatory
minimum sentence provisions).
69
United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004); see also Green Bag
Announces “Exemplary Legal Writing 2005” Honorees, GEO. MASON UNIV. SCH. LAW,
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/news/GB_Almanac (last visited Apr. 26, 2013)
(discussing how the Green Bag, a quarterly journal dedicated to good writing about the law,
awarded Judge Cassell’s opinion in United States v. Angelos its award for outstanding legal
writing).
70
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
71
Id. at 1230.
72
Id. at 1261.
73
Id. at 1262–63.
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opinion itself two tables which compared the sentence required in the
relatively minor Angelos case to the treatment of other crimes under the
guidelines and mandatory minimums, noting that the defendant’s
marijuana trafficking received a much higher mandated sentence than
crimes such as causing death as part of narcotics trafficking, hijacking an
aircraft multiple times, and raping ten-year-old children.74
A sitting judge is at the very point where the unprincipled numbers
meet the realities of a human life, and Judge Cassell’s opinion is
compelling in large part because it exposes the raw and human effects of
that interaction.
C. The Use of Weight as a Ranking of Culpability
Built into the mandatory minimums and Sentencing Guidelines
described above is an equally unsupportable and much older ranking
system—the assignment of sentences based on the weight of the
narcotics a defendant may possess with the intent to sell. For example, a
federal defendant who holds just twenty grams of cocaine and is
sentenced pursuant to the relevant guideline range faces an offense level
of twelve,75 while one who is caught with sixty kilograms is rated at an
offense level thirty-six.76 This translates, for defendants with no criminal
history or other relevant factors, into a guideline sentence of ten to
sixteen months for the former offender and 188–235 months for the
latter.77 This enormous gap exists because of the completely unfounded
assumption that the person who possesses the most narcotics is
necessarily the most culpable. This idea is undone by the simple reality
of mules: people who ferry large amounts of drugs from one place to
another for relatively low pay. They possess a lot of narcotics but are not
very culpable in the grand scheme of things. Moreover, incarcerating
mules, like incarcerating street dealers, will make almost no difference in
drug trafficking, because they are easily replaced by other low-wage
laborers.
By ranking the culpability of narcotics felons primarily based on the
weight of the narcotics they possess or possessed, we are using a very
crude measure of culpability and creating incentives to go after people
who really don’t matter much. The Sentencing Commission’s own data
reveals that this incentivization is exactly what is happening, with the
result that federal resources are too often being used primarily to pursue
people who are street dealers, mid-level managers, or mules. For
74
75
76
77

Id. at 1247.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(14) (2012).
Id § 2D1.1(c)(2).
Id. at ch. 5, pt. A., tbl.
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example, the Commission’s report to Congress on crack cocaine crimes
in 2007 revealed that 66.9% of crack defendants in federal court were
prosecuted for these lower-level actions, which combine low culpability
(by any realistic measure) with weight amounts significant enough to
Like the Guidelines and mandatory
trigger higher sentences.78
minimums generally, the use of weight as a proxy for culpability within
those systems does not reflect a reality; rather, it creates one that serves
no real social purpose.
D. Numbers of Convictions/Seizure of Narcotics
Press releases in federal drug cases consistently trumpet three things:
the amount of narcotics seized, the number of people arrested or
convicted, and the lengths of the sentences they received.79
Big numbers in any of these areas—big piles of marijuana, twentyseven defendant indictments, 360-month sentences—impress us. We are
accustomed to thinking in terms of numbers (as already established) and
these kinds of numbers often appeal to us visually, as well. We respond
to the image of a stack of marijuana bales or cocaine bricks,80 for
example, with a certain sense of satisfaction; it means that something is
being done about the drug problem.
Of course, this is often patently untrue. We assume that the measure
of success is amount of marijuana seized, or people arrested, or length of
sentence, but if what we care about is actually solving the drug problem,
none of those numbers are particularly useful because the drugs and the
people are often easily replaced. As it turns out, the sense of success
these big numbers convey is an illusion. Seizing stacks of marijuana and
cocaine, bringing in lots of arrests, and getting long sentences haven’t
resulted in success against the problem of narcotics trafficking and use.
The federal government’s own analysis shows that the use of narcotics in
this country remains at high levels, virtually unchanged from previous

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 19 fig. 2-4 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/20
0705_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf.
79
See News Releases, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/pr/
news.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (providing several years of DEA press releases). In
addition, U.S. Attorney’s offices often issue press releases at the time of indictment,
conviction, or sentencing.
80
See Pot King Gets 27 Years in $6M Bust: McChesney Faced a Minimum of 10 Years in
Prison, WANE.COM (Mar. 4, 2011, 3:47 PM), http://www.wane.com/dpp/news/matthewmcchesney-sentencing-marijuana-pot (providing images of drugs that were confiscated
during a bust in Fort Wayne, Indiana).
78
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years.81 The drug war, thus far, has been won by drugs, and the kind of
enforcement we have pursued may actually increase violence rather than
reduce it.82
We have assumed that if we seize a lot of drugs or imprison a group
of people that those drugs or people won’t be immediately replaced, but
too often there is no grounding in reality for those assumptions. Once
again, numbers, even in the absence of substance, create a reality: the
impression that something worthwhile is being accomplished, which
serves to garner continuing support for the institutions and people that
create this illusion.83
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR BETTER NUMBERS
A. A Better Number with Which to Evaluate Interdiction: Price
As the examples in Part II above show, informally compiled lists and
rankings perform three functions. They mask subjectivity with a veneer
of credibility. They draw interest. Perhaps most important, they create a
new reality and a set of outcomes that flow from that reality rather than
what actually pre-existed the list or ranking. We see all of these things at
work in American criminal law within the federal system. In the end, we
are left with an odd combination: numbers that seemingly announce a
remarkable string of successes and a tough approach on crime, and little
to no change in the actual problem being addressed.
This Article is not meant as a general screed against the use of
numerical evaluation—just the use of numerical systems that are made
up without a firm basis in reality. After all, without numerical
81
OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
MONITORING THE FUTURE STUDY HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/ondcp/Blog/2011_monitoring_the_future.pdf.
82
See generally Dan Werb et al., Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug Market Violence: A
Systematic Review, 22 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 87 (Mar. 2011), http://www.ihra.net/files/
2011/03/25/ICSDP_Violence_and_Enforcement_Report_March_2011.pdf (providing a
systematic review of the impact of drug law enforcement on drug market violence).
83
The focus on numbers in federal sentencing, and in particular the way the sentencing
process centers on calculating a guideline range from a number of numerical inputs, also
serves to greatly reduce the role allowed to a traditional tool of the oppressed: narrative.
While defendants are generally afforded a chance to speak at sentencing, this story-telling
moment is often secondary or tertiary and mooted by the number-driven process. The
relating of individualized circumstances is controlled and directed by the numerical matrix
of the Sentencing Guidelines, rather than the historical sorting mechanism for story-telling,
which is the passage of time. By reducing individualized circumstances to particularized
numerical inputs, federal sentencing takes leave of a rich and worthwhile ancient tradition
in sentencing, which allows the full story of the defendant, told holistically and
chronologically, to play a central role in the broad consideration of an appropriate
punishment.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 3 [2013], Art. 3

774

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

evaluations, such as stock prices, our economy would grind to a halt.
What is wrong with the rankings described here is that they don’t
correlate to real markets, and it could be that the solution lies with a
better use of economics and market analysis.
After all, the nonsense numbers described in Part II (“92 Cute Spring
Outfits”) would hardly withstand an economic analysis, because the
inputs are so purely subjective or are unrelated to any current reality or
guiding principle for which there might be a societal consensus. Instead,
the numbers create the illusion of a societal consensus in order to create
an effect. We are seduced by them, and seduction has little to do with
rational thinking and logic.
So what might an economic evaluation tell us about narcotics? At a
very basic level, an economic analysis would focus on markets, and the
measure of a market is price. Absent sudden changes in demand for a
product, if you increase the supply of that product, the price will go
down. If you decrease the supply, the price will go up. Given that, the
true measure of success in drug interdiction (which aims to diminish
supply) isn’t how many people you lock up, it is the price of that product
in a market.
Thus, the real evaluation tool for gauging our narcotics interdiction
efforts is street price. If that is true (and I think it is), the news isn’t good.
The price of cocaine and heroin actually went down during the height of
the “war on drugs.”84 Thus, the reality created by the primary normative
number systems described here—sentencing guidelines and mandatory
minimums—was not one that negatively impacted narcotics trafficking
by the best economic measure, price.
B. Using a Number that Works
As set out above, numbers of people incarcerated and pounds of
drugs seized are a lousy gauge of success in drug interdiction, and
mandatory minimums and tough sentencing guidelines don’t do much
to increase the price of drugs. If that is the case, what should be done to
eradicate drugs?

84
See generally Abdala Mansour, et al., Gangs and Crime Deterrence, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
315, 319 (2006); Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Illicit Drugs and the Americas: Avoiding a Pax
Mafiosa, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 57, Summer 2007, at 58 (2007), available at
dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00064.00008;
THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION,
RETHINKING U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS: A HEMISPHERIC PARTNERSHIP FOR A
TURBULENT WORLD 25–26 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin
_america_partnership.
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Just as economics and a focus on markets offer us a better method of
evaluation, it offers us a better means of interdiction, as well. The
narcotics trade, after all, is a business, and businesses are governed by
the rules of economics.
To start with, consider an accessible and worthwhile chapter from
perhaps the most popular economic book of the last few decades: 2005’s
Freakonomics, by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, devoted a
fascinating chapter to an analysis of the crack trade, titled, “Why Do
There, based on
Drug Dealers Still Live with Their Moms?”85
information from the inside of a drug-selling gang in Chicago, they
determined that street-level crack dealers in Chicago were making only
about $3.30 an hour.86 However, it was (like many other jobs in that
gang) a role that nearly anyone could do without special resources or
talents. The business, as a whole, has what economists call “low barriers
to entry.” The effect of low barriers to entry within the business of
narcotics at the bottom levels means quite simply that sweeping up lowwage labor will not make much difference. That, unfortunately, has
been at the forefront of our anti-drug efforts: sweeping up low-wage
labor in the person of mules, street dealers, and mid-level managers.
This effort has been sustained by the cynical manipulation of
meaningless numbers as described above—by claiming that the
possessor of five grams of methamphetamine is a “serious” trafficker,
that the Guidelines really express some rational ranking of harm, and
that weight is a true proxy for culpability.
A better method to raise the price of drugs (if that is what we want),
one rooted in business practices rather than a moral crusade, would be to
focus on the cash flow returning to bulk producers of narcotics. In other
words, ignore the people and take the money. Unlike the people we
imprison, that cash flow is not so easily replaced because drug dealers
do not have ready access to legitimate credit.87 At the very least, this
plan would offer a less destructive focus for our obsession with rankings
and numerical evaluation.
STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 89–116 (2005).
86
Id. at 103.
87
See Mark Osler, Osler: Cutting off Cash Flow the Way to End Drug Trafficking, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/21/cutting-offcash-flow-the-way-to-end-drug-traffick/ (discussing the above mentioned approach at
greater length); see also Mark Osler, What Would It Look Like if We Cared About Narcotics
Trafficking? An Argument to Attack Narcotics Capital Rather than Labor, 15 UDC/DCSL L.
REV. 113 (2011) (proposing a solution to the current drug sentencing problem); Mark Osler,
Narcotics:
Attack Capital, Not People, HUFFINGTONPOST (May 10, 2011, 5:09 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-osler/narcotics-attack-capital-not-people_b_86011
2.html (describing the theory being discussed in this Article in greater detail).
85
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IV. CONCLUSION
We can’t, and shouldn’t, completely avoid the use of numerical
matrices and rankings in our lives. However, we can be careful about
how such numerical systems are used, and we have done a lousy job of
this in the realm of criminal law. Rather than carefully creating
something like the Sentencing Guidelines or mandatory minimums
based on a well-thought-out ordering system that is rooted in reality, we
have created them thoughtlessly and without principle. This allows the
rankings contained in guidelines and mandatory minimums to direct
action and justify outcomes, despite the fact that they are rooted in
nothing.
The cost of this mistake is profound and extends beyond the brutal
cost of over-sentencing. The price of fake rankings also includes the loss
of any comprehensive moral basis for this important social function.
Without principles and reality informing these most directive and
dramatic societal actions, the law is nothing but a bully.
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